Treasury’s Absolutely Ridiculous Plan
Bailouts work when one or two otherwise viable companies need temporary assistance either to survive a short-term cash shortage or to effect an orderly wind-down. An example of a successful bailout occurred in 1998 when Wall Street and the Feds came together to prevent the immediate bankruptcy of Long Term Capital Management—in that case, Wall Street firms bore the brunt of the monetary pain. LTCM’s bailout, although government initiated, also posed a low risk of moral hazard because the plan was an industry-funded solution and was manageable because it only involved one firm.
The government rescue of an entire industry felled by greed and poor leadership, however, becomes an expensive quagmire, which is what TARP is proving to be.
After LTCM’s rescue, the Cleveland Fed reviewed the Federal Reserve’s action. The number one lesson learned: Context matters. Large losses at a financial firm do not by themselves create a need for Federal Reserve action; the losses must have a systemic component.
While one could argue that the failure of the big three would worsen the unemployment significantly and cause a spate of follow-on bankruptcies, the orderly unwinding of the auto manufacturers still does not pose the same kind of systemic risk that failure of the major U.S. commercial banks would have.
A bailout for the Big Three also would not force the kind of changes that domestic auto manufactures need but which a pre-packaged bankruptcy plan created outside a courtroom might. More importantly, it would prevent the obvious scenario a few months from now when the auto industry comes back for an even bigger handout.
The financial services bailout is exhorbitant, messy and rife with moral hazard. It was also necessary to avoid a meltdown of world financial markets. Unpalatable as a bailout for financial services is for the country, replicating it for the automakers makes no sense.

